Clearfield State Bank v. W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah; and Bank of Northern Utah : Respondents Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1970 
Clearfield State Bank v. W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah; and Bank of Northern Utah : 
Respondents Brief 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.J. Duffy Palmer and H. Wright Volker; Attorneys for 
Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Clearfield State Bank v. Brimhall, No. 11900 (1970). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4980 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 




W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions of the 
State of Utah; and 
Case No. 
11900 




REsPoNoENT's BAI EF 
Appeal from a Judgment of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge 
RAYMOND W. GEE 
Attorney at Law 
400 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff Appellant 
J. DUFFY PALMER 
Attorney at Law 
40 South 125 East Street 
Clearfield, Utah 
Attorney for Bank of Northern Utah 
Defendant-Respondent 
H. WRIGHT VOLKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol BuilHing 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for W. S. Brimhall, 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
Defendant-Respondent 
INDEX 
ATEME::NT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 







The proposed bank does not constitute a branch bank so 
to violate state law. 
Po111 t 11 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
The commissioner of financial institutions was not guilty 
of prejudicial error in refusing to disclose or in failing to 
allow discovery of information which was immaterial and 
irrelevant. 
Point 111 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 3 
The reljuired capital surplus of the proposed bank need not 
be paid in until such time as the certificate of incorporation 
is issued. 
Point I V ------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
The findings of the commissioner of financial institutions 
in this matter are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record and his exercise of discretion in regards thereto was 
not arbitrary or capricious. 
p 0 i 11 t v ------ --------------------------------------- --------------------- 18 
The proposed location of the defendant applicant is not in 
such close proximity to the Clearfield State Bank as to 
make improbable the succes of either. 
CO NC LU SI 0 N -------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
INDEX TO CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES CITED 
American Foundry and klachine Co. vs. Utah Labor 
Relations Board, (Ut), 141P2d390 (1943) ------------- \4 
Application of Kennelworth State Bank, 
4 9 NJ 3 3 0, 2 3 0 A 2 d 3 7 7 --------------------------------- 6, 7. 12 
Camden Trust Co. vs. Gidney 
(CA DC Cir 1961) 301 F2d 251 ------------------------ 5, 7. 12 
Daniel vs. Best 
224 Iowa 1348, 279 NW 374 (1938) ----------------------- 3 
First National Bank of Billings vs. First Bank Stock Co., 
(CA 9th Cir 1962) 306 F2d 937 ------------------------ 5, 7, 12 
Goldy vs. Crane 
(Colo) 44 5 P2d 212 ( 1 968) ----------------------------------- 4, 7 
Howard vs. Lindmier 
(Wyo) 214 P2d 7 3 7 ------------------------------------------------ 14 
Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. vs. Welling 
9 U2d 114, 339 P2d 1011 (1959) ------------------------ 14 
McNight vs. State Lane Board 
14 U2d 238, 381 P2d 726 (1963) -------------------------- 14 
Nemurow vs. Bloom 
(Colo) 445 P2d 214 (1968) ------------------------------------
People Bank vs. Banking Board 
(Colo) 436 P2d 681 (1968) 4, 7' 12 
Petition of the City of Bellevue 
62 Wash 2d 458, 383 P2d 286 --------------------------------- 14 
Richard Mast vs. State Board of Optometry 
(Cal) 293 P2d 148 (1956) ----------------------------- 14 
State ex rel Cosmopolis vs. Bruno 
61 Wash 2d 461, 379 P2d 691 
1' S vs. Pierce Auto Freight Lines 
<i6 S Ct 687, 327 US 515 ------------------------------------------ 9 
[,'ra/1 0as Service Co. vs. Afountain Fuel Supply Co., 
( Utah) , 4 2 2 P 2 d 5 3 0 ( 1 96 7) ------------------------------------- 9 
Witney National Bank in Jefferson Parish vs. Bank of 
New Orleans and Trust Co., 323 F2d 290 ------------------ 8 
/,ions First National Bank (NA) vs. Taylor 
15 U2d 239, 390 P2d 854 (1964) -------------------- 14, 18 
TEXTS CITED 
23 ALR 3rd 683 ---------------------------------------------------------- 3 
7 3 CJS, Public Administrative Law and Procedure 210 --- 9 
ST A TUTES CITED 
Section 7-1-26 UCA, 1953, as amended ----------------- 9, 14, 20 
Section 7-3-6 UCA, 19 53, as amended -------------------- 13, 20 
Section 7-3-10 UCA, 1953, as amended ------------------- 10, 13 
Section 7-3-11 UCA, 1953 -------------------------------------- 13 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 





W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions of the 
State of Utah; and 






STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This action is brought for a review of the decision and 
proceedings of the defendant Commissioner of Financial In-
>titutions in authorizing the Bank of Northern Utah to establish 
a bank in Clearfield, Utah, pursuant to the order of said 
Commissioner, dated March 12, 1969. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court awarded judgment in favor of de-
fendants and against plaintiff, of no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondents seek affirmation of the lower 
court decision and the action of the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions in authorizing the Bank of Northern Utah to estab-
lish a bank in Clearfield, Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The application of defendant, Bank of Northern Utah_ 
to establish a unit bank in Clearfield, Utah, was filed Septelllber 
17, 1968 (R 50) and appellant, Clearfield State Bank, immedi-
ately filed protest. A hearing on the application was had 
November 26, 1968. 
At said hearing substantial evidence was presented show-
ing a need for another bank in Clearfield. It was established that 
Clearfield, a city of in excess of 10,000 people, was served bv 
only one bank, the appellant herein, and that the trading 
which would be served by the appellant, Clearfield State Bank. 
and the respondent, Bank of Northern Utah, would include a ' 
population of in excess of 15,000 people. (Tr 129, 132) 
Further, it was pointed out that Davis County is the 
fastest growing county in the State of Utah (Tr 118) and that 
the median income of families in Davis County and particularly 1 
in Clearfield City was among the highest in the State (Ex 1, pps 1 
67,68,69) facts which were born out by the substantial growth 
experienced by the appellant, Clearfield State Bank, and other 
banks in the area over the past ten years. (Ex 1, p 50) 
The need for another bank in Clearfield was further 
pointed up by the fact that only three counties in the State have 
more population per banking facility than does the Davis County 
and the Clearfield area. (Tr 13 2, Ex 1, p 4 5) 
The Mayor of Clearfield City and the President of the 
Clearfield Chamber of Commerce each testified that, based on 
the information and knowledge acquired by them while acting 
in their official capacities, another bank was necessary in the 
Clearfield area. (Tr 22-23, 39-44) 
Substantial evidence was presented as to the character 
and fitness of the incorporators (personal information sheets, 
Tr 57-60, 146, 253) and as to the projected profitability of the 
proposed bank (Tr 5 7-7 3) so as to insure the protection of the 
citizens in the Clearfield area. 
Based on the information presented at the hearing, a 
small portion of which is set out above, the Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions approved the application of the Bank of 
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Northern Utah by Order dated March 12, 1969 (R 6-10). Sub-
1cquently plaintiff-appellant prosecuted its review of that order 
;.1 the District Court. The District Court after hearing oral 
.,.·,:u111cnt and reviewing the complete record entered its 
::ll" '>randum decision affirming tl-e action of the Com-
of Financial Institutions. (R 24-34) From which de-
mion the appellant, Clearfield State Bank has prosecuted review 
to this Court. 
For the purposes of this brief, the transcript of the 
administrative hearing is referred to by the abbreviation, "Tr.", 
and the exhibits, as marked in the hearing. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE PROPOSED BANKING FACILITY DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A BRANCH BANK SO AS TO VIOLATE UTAH 
LAW. 
In recent years the question of what constitutes branch 
banking has been much litigated in the courts of this country. 
Under the decisions of those courts treating tre question, it is 
clear that the proposed bank here in question would not be 
considered a branch bank. 
One of the earliest cases to consider the question was 
the case of Daniel vs. Best 224 Iowa 1348, 279 NW 374 (1938); 
23 ALR 3d 683, there two new banks were proposed by the 
stockholders of an existing bank when they voted the appro-
priation of part of the surplus of the latter to the organization 
of the new banks. The court held that the new banks were not 
branch banks in spite of the fact that the two new banks were 
managed by a board of three trustees selected by the directors 
of the existing bank from their own members, which three 
trustees were the president, vice-president and cashier of the 
existing banks. The court reasoned that where the business of 
each bank was conducted independent of one another and of 
the existing banks, and where each bank kept separate records 
they did not constitute branch banks. 
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The Colorado Supreme Court in rt:cent decisions hJi 
reached results similar to that of the Iowa Court. J>eoplcs lla 11 k 
vs. Banking Board, (Colo). 436 P2d 681 (1968);Goldy 1•s. Crai" 
(Colo), 445 P2d 212 (1968); Nemurow l'S. 13100111, (Colo), 44r
1 
P2d 214 (1968). 
In the )Jeoples Bank case, supra, the Supreme Court ot 
Colorado affirmed the granting of an application in which the 
existing Guaranty Bank and Trust Co., of Denver, through it.i 
executive officers, put together the materials contained in the 
application. The court noted that the stock ownership of the two , 
banks would be the same and proportionately identical; that the 
board of directors and chief executive officers would be the same: 
that the employees of the new bank would be trained and furn. 
ished by Guaranty Trust and that all accounting for the new 
bank would be done by the later. In upholding the Commission· 
er's action, the court stated that in order to establish that a pro- , 
posed bank is a branch bank, the protestant must show that in 
substance Guaranty Bank and Trust was doing business through 
the instrumentality of the newly proposed bank or vice versa, in 
the same way as if the institutions were one, and that such had 
not been shown. 
The Crane case, supra, followed the rationale of the 
Peoples Bank Case, supra. In this case the Colorado Banking 
Commission denied the charter of three proposed industrial 
banks on the ground that they would constitute branch banks. 
The District Court reversed the decision and the Supreme Court 
affirmed such reversal. The facts of the case were, that except for 
the resident office manager, each bank would have common off , 
icers and directors, that all said officers and directors were also 
officers and directors of Continental Finance Corporation of 
America, a holding company; that such holding company owned 
all the stock of two existing Colorado banks and would hold all 
the stock in the three new banks; and that the manager of each 
new bank would have limited loan authority. The court in allow· 
ing the charter to issue, noted that each proposed bank wa_s' 
separate corporation; organized as an independent corporatton 
entirely; each bank having its own independent capital structure: 
and each with a separate and independent loan basis; factors 
which the court held, indicated an independent banking oper-
ation. The court concluded then by holding: 
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'That it is not enough to show common control 
tk :.rngh common stock ownership and partici-
pation, but it must be shown that the alleged bank 
is doing business with the alleged parent in the 
same way as if the institutions were one; and, it 
must be shown that, 'the unitary type of oper-
ation', which is the hallmark of branch banks is 
present". 
Federal Courts which have considered the question in the 
context of adjudication under the National Banking Act ( 12 USC 
Section 26) which makes state branch banking laws applicable 
to national banks, have reached a similar result. First National 
Bank of Billings vs. First Bank Stock Co., (CA 9th Cir 1962) 306 
F2d 937; Camden Trust Co. vs. Gidney (CA DC Cir 1961), 301 
F2d 251. 
In the First National Bank case, supra, the Circuit Court 
held that it was not enough to show common ownership and con-
trol through stock ownership, and further that the fact that two 
banks had common directors and that one bank allowed the 
other to use its night deposit and vault facilities was not sufficient 
to show a branch bank. The Court pointed out that the two 
banks were separate corporations, each with its own capital, sur-
plus and undivided profit, and its separate banking house. 
As stated by the Court the critical question was whether 
one bank was doing business through the instrumentality of the 
other or vice versa, in the same way as if the institutions were 
one. 
The second Federal case having bearing on the question 
is that of Camden Trust Co. vs. Gidney, supra. This was a suit by 
a New Jersey banking corporation to enjoin the Comptroller of 
Currency from issuing a certificate of authority to permit a 
national bank to establish a banking facility in Camden. 
Under the facts of the case, nine directors of the Hadden-
field National Bank filed an application for a new bank and 
appellants objected before the Comptroller. The court upheld 
rhe granting of the application even though directors and stock-
holders cf Haddenfield National would :ilso be directors and 
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and stockholders of the new bank. The Court pointed out that 
the capital structure of the two was completely independent, that 
the new bank's stockholders would be liable for their shares in 
the new bank independent of Hadden field and that the new bar,'., 
was located 2 miles from the office of Hadden field. 
The court placed great emphasis on the fact that dc!Jmi:s 
with the new bank would be its own liability and not Hadden-
fields and that its loan limits would be those applicable to an 
independent bank, based on its own capital structure and totally 
independent of loan limitations applicable to Haddenfield 
National. 
The cirtical factors which must be examined in dctermin 
ing the existence of a branch bank as indicated by the cases 
above was succinctly stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in a recent decision . . -1pplication of Kc11nel1l'ortl1 State Rank, 49 
NJ 330, 230 A2d 377. 1967. 23 ALR 3rd 683. 686. 
The facts of that case were very similar to these now be-
fore the court, in that an established bank appealed the granting 
of a charter to another banking institution to locate in the com-
munity on the grounds that the new bank was in fact a branch 
of the other institution and thereby prohibited from locating in 
the community. The court affirmed the granting of the charter 
notwithstanding the fact that a majority of the outstanding stock 
of the new bank and the directorship would be in the hands of 
the stockholders and directors of the other bank. In so holding, 
the court distinguished a branch bank from other banking re-
lationships in the following terms: 
"A branch bank is not a separate corporation or 
legal entity but is an office or agency operated by 
the legal entity which operates the main bank. It 
has no separate board of directors or capital 
structure. its deposits arc pooled with those of 
the main bank and its loan limits arc based on 
the main bank's capital structure." 
In applying the law as hereinabove sctforth to the facts 
of this case, it is clear that the proposed bank docs not constitute 
a branch of the Bank of Utah. 
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The testimony at the hearing and the application itself 
clearly indicates that the proposed bank will be a separate legal 
entity ort,anized under the corporate laws of the State of Utah. 
A3 testified by Mr. Beutler the proposed bank will have 
" ocparate and distinct board of directors and although some of 
rhe members of said board are also directors of the Bank of Utah 
1Tr J 55) this has no bearing on the question of whether the pro-
posed bank constitutes a branch bank. Peoples Bank vs. Bank-
ing Hoard, supra; Goldy vs. Crane, supra; First National Bank of 
Hi/lings i•s. First Bank Stock Co.; (CA 9th Cir 1962) 306 F2d 
937: Camden Trust Co. vs. Gidney, supra; Application of 
Ke1111elworth State Bank, supra. 
That this is a common practice in banking circles around 
the nation and here in Utah is evidenced by the testimony of Mr. 
Beutler, wherein he testified that the practice of interlocking 
officers and directors is common in Utah (Tr. 111) and that 
()ne Emerson Sturdevant is an officer or director of at least six 
different banks in the State. (Tr. 109) 
Mr. Beutler further testified that at least seven other 
banks in the State had officers or directors which were also 
ufficers or directors of at least one other bank. (Tr. 109-111) 
The president of the proposed bank will be a person not 
affiliated with the Bank of Utah in any way. Also, said bank 
will have its own separate employees and location (Tr 94,147, 
150). of even more significance is the fact that the proposed 
bank will have its own separate loan base independent of any 
other bank. With its o.vn deposit liability and loan limitations. 
(Tr 61, et seq) 
The stock ownership in the proposed bank will not be 
entirely in the hands of any other bank; however, certain of the 
present applicants do hold approximately 51% of the outstand-
ing stock of the Bank of Utah (Tr. 157). However, the fact of 
common stock ownership has no bearing on the question of 
whether the proposed bank constitutes a branch bank. Peoples 
Hank vs. Banking Board, supra; First National Bank of Billings 
1•s. First Bank Stock Co., supra. 
-7-
That common stock ownership is a common practice lt, 
banking circles was evidenced by the testimony of Dr. Nelson, an 
officer of First Security Corporation, called as a witness for 
plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank, who admitted that the First 
Security Corporation owned the controlling stock in both l;" 
First Security State Bank and First Security Bank (NA). (Tr 3%. 
Protestant in its brief makes great issue out of the similar-
ity of the name of the proposed bank and that of the Bank of 
Utah. However, it conveniently ignores the same similarity be-
tween one of the protestants, First Security State Bank anrl 
First Security Bank (NA). 
It should be noted that protestant cities to no competent 
authority for its assertions as to what constitutes branch bank 
ing, but rests its arguments on secondary authorities and cam 
dealing with matters completely outside the banking area. The , 
only case which has any relevancy at all is the case of Whitne_v 
National Bank in Jefferson Parish vs. Bank of New Orleans arid 
Trust Co. (CA DC Cir 1963) 323 F2d 290, reversed 379 US 411. 
Which was decided under a Louisana Law which prohibited the 
opening of new banks through holding companies and therefore. 1 
is inapplicable in this case. 
As clearly indicated by the law and facts as recited above. ' 
the proposed Bank of Northern Utah possesses all the attributes 
of a unit bank. Such bank is an independent legal entity, with a 
separate capital structure and with its own separate and distinct 
loan base and deposit liability, operating at a separate and distinct 
location. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS WAS NOT GUILTY OF PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO DISCLOSE OR IN 
FAILING TO ALLOW DISCOVERY OF INFOR-
MATION WHICH WAS IMMATERIAL AND IR-
RELEVANT. 
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It is well recognized by the courts of this country and the 
Stare of Utah, that alleged errors in proceedings before admin-
tstrat_1ve bodies which do the complaining party no inurywill not 
1
c;suty the determination of such body. Utah Gas 
\, : ;•,cc Co. vs. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Utah) 422 P2d 530 
:1967) 18 ALR 2d552SectionlO;U.S.vs.PierceAutoFreight 
Lines, 66 S Ct 687, 327 US 515; 73 CJS, Public Administrative 
Bodies and Procedures 210. 
In the matter before the court, plaintiff alleges that the 
Commissioner committed reversable error in not allowing them 
to see the financial statements of the applicants and in refusing 
to disclose a list of stockholders of the Bank of Utah and the 
Bank of Ben Lomond. 
Assuming without admitting that the plaintiff had a right 
to such documents, the question remains, was the withholding 
of such documents prejudicial to the plaintiffs so as to constitute 
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion on the part of 
the Commissioner. 
Section 7-1-26 UCA 1953 as amended, sets forth the cir-
cumstances in which the Commissioner may refuse to approve 
an application for a unit bank in essentially the following terms: 
1. When the plan of operation does not comply with 
the laws of Utah, or with accepted and prevailing 
practices; or, 
2. When the incorporators or organizers shall not be of 
such a character, responsibility and general fitness as to 
warrant a belief that the business will be honestly con-
ducted in accordance with law and for the best interests 
of the members, customers and depositors of the in-
stitution; or, 
3. When the location or field of operation of the pro-
posed business shall be in such close proximity to an 
established business subject to the banking laws of the 
State, that such established business might be unreason-
ably interfered with and the support of the new business 
would be such as to make improbable its success; or, 
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4. When other good and sufficient reasons exist for ' 
such refusal. 
Under the provisions of the above Statute the rnly jLt r-
?1ination to b_e n:ade as to the applicants individually 
m approving the application, ts whether the incorporators or 
organizers are of such character, responsibility and general fit. 
ness as to warrant the belief that the business will be conducted 
in accordance with law and for the best interest of the members 
customers and depositors of the institution. There is no require, 
ment that any finding as to the financial status of the organizers 
be made. 
That ths was the intent of the legislature is evidenced by 
the fact that Section 7-3-10 UCA 1953 as amended, specifically 
provides that the proposed bank before commencing business 
must have a certain amount of subscribed stock and a certain 
expense fund. The critical points being that such financial re-
quirements are to be met before commencing business and not 
at the time of application, and that the Statute limits the 
question of financial responsibility specifically to the bank as an 
entity and not to the independent financial ability of its organ-
izers and incorporators. 
As to the question of the general fitness of the applicants 
the record is more than adequate to support that finding. This 
is evidenced by the background information sheets on the appli-
cation submitted to the Commissioner and by the qualifications 
of the applicants which were brought out during the course oi 
the hearing. (Tr 57-60, 146, 253) 
This fact was recognized by Judge Bryant H. Croft of the 
District Court who after studying the complete record affirmed 
the Commissioner's action and in so doing stated: 
"(T)hat in this case no effort is made, and in-
deed none could be made, to content that the in-
tended incorporators of the Bank of Northern 
Utah are of such a character, responsibility and 
general fitness as to warrant the belief that the 
business would not be honestly conducted in 
accordance with law and the best interest of the 
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members, customers and depositors of the in-
stitution. Indeed, the one complaint made about 
the incorporators is that most of them are es-
tablished, experienced bankers in the Davis-Weber 
County areas ............. " (R 29) 
From the above it is evident that under the clear meaning 
of the Statute no finding need be made on the particular finan-
cial status of the applicants. Even assuming without admitting 
that it was error to withhold the financial statements; such 
statements were irrelevant and immaterial in the determination 
of this question in that substantial evidence found in the record 
supports the finding that the applicants are of such a charact-
er, responsibility and general fitness as to warrant the belief that 
said bank will be conducted honestly in accordance with law and 
in the best interest of the members, customers, and depositors 
of said bank. 
The second allegation made by the appellants is that they 
were prejudiced by the Commissioner's failure to disclose to 
them a list of stockholders of the Bank of Utah and the Bank of 
Ben Lomond, an argument which is frivolous for at least two 
reasons. 
In the first instance, it must be recognized that in fact 
the plaintiffs were given information as to what interest the pro-
posed incorporators held in both the Bank of Utah and the Bank 
of Ben Lomond. In that regard, it was testified that the incor-
porators did not own the controlling interest in the Bank of Ben 
Lomond, but that they did in the Bank of Utah. (Tr 156, 15 7, 
159, 160) Further, plaintiffs had the opportunity to question the 
individual incorporators as to their interest and were in fact, in-
vited to do so. (Tr 158) However, they declined said invitation. 
(Tr 159) At no point in the record did the plaintiff question the 
incorporators as to their individual holdings in other banks al-
though presented with the opportunity to do so. (Tr 57-112, 
154, 146-152, 253-270) 
Secondly, under the law as it exists in this country and 
the State of Utah, the question of stock ownership in other 
banking institutions has no bearing on the determination of 
whether to approve an application for a unit bank. 
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The courts have uniformily held that stock ownership 15 
irrelevant as a test to determine the existence of a branch bank 
Peoples Bank vs. Banking Board, supra; Goldy vs. Crane, supro: 
Application of Kennelworth State Rank, supra; First National 
Bank of Billings vs. First Bank Stock Co., supra; Ca1nde;i i.·•ii, 
Co. vs. Gidney, supra. 
Further, under Utah Law, the requirements for the estab-
lishment of a unit bank are established by Section 7-1-26 UCA 
1953, as amended, which is essentially setforth in Point I. Under 
this provision the question of stock ownership in another bank 
has no bearing on the statutory requirements which must be met 
to establish a unit bank. Nor, is there any law in the State of 
Utah which makes illegal bank holding companies as such. 
Therefore, for tre court, at this point, to make stock 
ownership in other banks a criterion for the approving of appli-
cations for unit banks would amount to legislation on its part. 
gard: 
As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in this re-
" ..... (T)he legislature could have, but did not pro-
hibit an individual from being a stockholder or a 
director in more than one bank. Nor did it adopt 
any inactment aimed specifically at chain bank-
ing resulting from such common stock holdings 
and directorships. In view of the well recognized 
distinction between chain and branch banking, 
the legislature restrictions aimed specifically at 
branch banking should not be extended by the 
judiciary to banks which are independently struct-
ured and operated though affiliated. If the legis-
lature wishes such extension it may adopt suitable 
enactmento .......... " 
Application of Kennelworth State Bank, supra. 
From the foregoing it is obvious that in fact the plaintiff ' 
was supplied with information as to the stock ownership of the 
applicants in the Bank of Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomo_nd. 
However, even assuming such information had not been supplied 
to the plaintiffs it would not constitute prejudicial error in t_hat 
such information was irrelevant and immaterial to the questwn 1 
then before the Commissioner. ' 
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POINT HI 
THE REQUIREDCAPITALAND SURPLUS OF 
THE PROPOSED BANK NEED NOT BE PAID 
IN UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CERTIFICATE 
OF INCORPORATION IS ISSUED. 
Section 7-3-10 UCA 1953, as amended, sets forth the 
minimum subscribed capital which a bank must have in order to 
commence business. 
The point at which a proposed bank must establish that 
it has such required capital is established by Section 7-3-11 
UCA, 1953, as amended, which provides as follows: 
"The Secretary of State shall not issue a certifi-
cate of incorporation to any bank authorizing it 
to do business in this State until it shall appear to 
him by the affidavit of at least three of the incor-
porators that the proposed corporation has the 
requisite amount of capital stock subscribed and 
also the required surplus and that at least fifty 
per cent of the capital stock and surplus of the 
corporation has been paid in cash." 
Therefore, it is clear that the statutory requirements as to 
the capital and surplus must be met at the time the certificate of 
incorporation is to be issued and not when the application for 
its approval is filed with the Commissioner. 
POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THIS MATTER 
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVID-
ENCE IN THE RECORD AND HIS EXERCISE 
OF DISCRETION IN REGARDS THERETO 
WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
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Section 7-1-26 UCA 1953, as amended, provides that 
the reviewing court reverse the_ decision of the Banking 
Comm1ss1oner only m mstances where It fmds that such decisions 
are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law. 
in _order for _the court to upset the ruling cif 
the Comm1ss10n m this matter, It must find that such decision ii 
not supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as 
a whole, or that it is arbitrary or capricious. Zions First National 1 
Bank (NA) vs. Taylor 15 U2d 239, 390 P2d 854 (1964 ). 1\1cNiRht 
vs. State Land Board 14 U2d 238, 381 P2d 726 ( 1963). 
In holding that an administrative agency has acted arbit-
rary or capricious the courts seem to require unreasoning action 
by the agency in disregard of facts and circumstances. However. 
when there is room fer two opinions, action is not arbitrary or 
capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration 
even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion hJ1 
been reached. State ex rel Cosmopolis vs, Bruno, 61Wash2d 461. 
379 P2d 691; Petition of the City of Bellevue 62 Wash 2d 458. 
383 P2d 286. Further, the court may not substitute its judg-
ment in discretionary matters for that of the administrative 
agency. Zions First National Bank (NA) vs. Taylor, supra. 
The inquiry as to whether substantial evidence appears 
from the record to substantiate the administrative agencies fact-
ual findings, is limited to the question of whether there exists. 
in the record such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept such as adequate to support a conclusion. America11 
Foundry and Machine Co. vs. Utah Labor Relations Board,(Utah) 
141 P2d 390 (1943); Howard vs. Lindmier, (Wyo), 214 P2d 737. 
At the outset it should be noted that administrative 
agencies are not bound by the technical rules of evidence appli-
cable to a court of law and in fact may and should admit hearsay 
evidence if it is relevant and of such a character, and or quality 
as that on which responsible persons are accusr,,med to rely in 
conduct of serious affairs. Richard Mast vs. State Board of 
Optometry; (Cal), 193 P2d 148 (1956). That this is the law in ' 
Utah is evidenced by the decision of this court in the case of 
Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. vs. Welling, 9 U2d 114, 339 
P2d 1011 (1959) wherein the court indicated that fact findings 
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b;ised to some extent on hearsay evidence were not invalid if 
q 1ch findings were also supported by a residuum of competent 
c·v1Jcncc. 
In the matter here before the court, each finding made 
h. (.< C:olllmissioner is supported by competent evidence in the 
1ccord. 
Mr. Charles Cuneo, the Superintendent of the DelMonte 
Distribution Center at the Freeport Center, and President of the 
Clearfield Chamber of Commerce (Tr 22) testified that in his 
opinion another bank was needed in Clearfield (Tr 32). Said 
opinion being based on knowledge acquired by Mr. Cuneo 
rhrough his activities as President of the Clearfield Chamber of 
Commerce and Superintendent of the DelMonte Distribution 
Center: and from official records submitted to him in his official 
capacity as President of the Chamber of Commerce (Tr 24 ). 
The argument that Mr. Cuneo's testimony is rank hear-
,;1v and not entitled to any probative value is succinctly put to 
rest in the Lakesl1ore case, supra., wherein this court in ruling 
that the opinion of an applicant as to the need for carrier ser-
vice was sufficient to support a finding stated: 
"(T)hat a moments reflection makes plain that 
a very high proportion of the knowledge of man-
kind is acquired through sharing of experiences 
of others and from sources which, in one sense, 
might be considered as hearsay. We do not and 
could not, experience everything first hand, but 
we do obtain much credible evidence and know-
ledge from many sources other than experiencing 
the primary facts themselves." (9 U2d 114, 339 
P2dl011) 
Added testimony of the need for another bank in Clear-
field was given by the Mayor of Clearfield City who testified as 
to the growth of the community as evidenced by new business 
!Tr 41), increased activity at Hill Air Force Base (Tr 40), and 
increased population over the past years. (Tr 43) 
The need and feasibility of another bank in Clearfield 
City was further substantiated by the study prepared by Dr. 
Milton Matthews, an expert in the field of Marketing, (EX 1) and 
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one experienced in projecting the need and probable succc 51 ,,f • 
business based on population and other data. 
Dr. Matthews ciualification a11d '"f)cricnce in this fitld 
is unquestionable and in fact. he has, in the past, prepared oi ... :: .. 
studies of the C:learfield and Davis County areas for one of tk 
protestanb here. 1-ie acted as consultant to many orhc· 
banks and financial institutions (Tr 11 5, 117; Ex 1 per:-onal , 
qualifications). 
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing it was 
established that Davis County and the Clearfield area is one of 
the fastest growing areas in the State. (Tr 118, 407, 408) 
Evidence established the approximate population of 
Davis County in excess of 95,000, with approximately 50,000 
people residing in the Clearfield and the North Davis County 
area (Tr 128 Ex 1, p 16). The City of Clearfield itself having a 
population of in excess of 10,000 people. (Tr 129) 
Dr. Matthews further testified to the fact that the trading 
area of the proposed Bank of Northern Utah and the appellant, 
Clearfield State Bank would not be limited to Clearfield City 
itself, but would also include the surrounding communities of 
Syracuse, West Point, Sunset and Clinton. (Tr 129) This fact was 
substantiated by the testimony of Mr. Steed, an officer of the 
plaintiff, when he testified that a good portion of the trade of 
appellant, Clearfield State Bank, came from outside Clearfield 
City. (Tr 331) 
The trading area which is served by the appellant, Clear· 
field State Bank and which would be served by the defendant, 
Bank of Northern Utah has a population of approximately 
15 ,000 people (Tr 129). A fact which makes the average popula· 
tion per banking facility in this area double what it is for Davis 
County as a whole and almost two and half times greater than 
the average for the entire state. (Tr. 132) 
Further justification for the granting of the application 
here in question is evidenced by the fact that the median family 
income in Davis County and the Clearfield area is among the 
highest in the State (Ex 1, pps 67, 68, 69) andaswouldbecx· 
pected the number of families having incomes less than $3,000. 
00, among the lowest (Tr 140). 
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The growth and prosperity of the area was further 
pointed up by the above average valuation of the owner occupied 
huusing in the area (Ex 1, p 40) and the substantial growth with 
tfie banks in the North Davis area, including the plaintiff, have 
c:-:pcri•·nccd over the past ten years. (Ex 1, p 50) 
Dr. Matthews testified that based on his study, it was 
hi:. opinion that another bank was needed in Clearfield and that 
in fact he had first recognized this need ten years before while 
doing a previous study of the area. (Tr 164) 
In regards to the projected profitability of the proposed 
Bank of Northern Utah, defendant, called as its witness Mr. 
William W. Beutler, an individual of extensive experience in the 
banking field, who had testified before the Commissioner on 
previous occasions (Tr 61 ). Mr. Beutler testified that the pro-
pmed bank could operate profitably in Clearfield City (Tr 61 et 
>eq.). basing said projection on what he, as an experienced 
banker would estimate the cost to be in running such a bank 
Jnd on the expected volume of business as projected from the 
growth trends setforth in Dr. Matthews' study. (Tr 65, Ex 1, 
p 50) 
It is evident from the record that in terms of population 
and the general characteristics of the Clearfield area in regards to 
employment, income and growth potential that another bank is 
needed in Clearfield City. 
The plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank relied heavily on 
two points in support of their argument of the lack of any need 
for another bank in Clearfield. The first being the high per-
centage of persons under 18 years of age in Davis County and 
second, the low per capita sales tax collected in the area. (Tr 
384, Tr 377) 
As to the former, plaintiff would have us believe that 
the fact that there are more_ persons under 1? years of age in 
Davis County indicates less of a need for a banking facility. On 
closer observation it becomes clear that such a statistic is only 
more evidence of what Dr. Matthews established; namely, that 
said area is growing, that young families are moving in, and with 
them bring more demand for the money and services which a 
bank is equipped to supply. As to the question oflow per capita 
sales tax collection in the area, this factor is nothing more than 
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an indication that facilities are lacking in the area, and that whe: 
facd1t1es arc not available people will go elsewhere to find th 
A fact whi.ch. was recognized by Dr. Nelson, called as a 
by the plamt1ff. (Tr 404) In this regard he further testified th, 
in fact the banks in Davis County did not have sufficient 1
1 
d: 
capacity to meet the needs of the residents and that 
being forced to go to Ogden and Salt Lake to meet these need. 
(Tr419) 
Under the above analysis, it is clear that there is in tht 
record substnatial evidence to support the finding of the Com 
missioner of Financial Institutions in this matter and the fact' 
that. he chose to give more weight to evidence presented by the , 
applicant than to that presented by the plaintiff is a matter w1th 
in his discretion and does not constitute a basis for this court to 
disturb his decision. 
POINT V 
THE PROPOSED LOCATION OF THE DE-
FENDANT APPLICANT IS NOT IN SUCH 
CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE CLEARFIELD 
STATE BANK AS TO MAKE IMPROBABLE 
THE SUCCESS OF EITHER. 
Section 76-1-26, UCA 1953, as amended, provides in pan 
that the Commissioner of Financial Institutions may deny an 
application when the location or field of operation of the pro 
posed business shall be in such close proximity to an established ' 
business subject to this title that such established business might , 
be unreasonably interfered with and the support of the nrn 
business would be such as to make improbable its success. 
The extent of the Commissioner's discretion in making 
such a determination was succinctly setforth by this court in the ' 
case of Zions First National Bank vs. Taylor, 15 U2d 239, 390 , 
P2d 854. In that case the court in discussing the "close pron 
mity" question in connection with branch banks noted that 
"close proximity" in and of itself was not determinative of the 
question and stated that: 
-18-
"l t is the duty and prerogative of the Bank Com-
missioner to determine whether a branch bank 
:1 p plication shall be granted or denied. He must 
ci.:cide if the establishment of a new branch would 
uw, asonable interfere with the business of an 
Lxisting bank or branch. The courts will not over 
ruk his de_cision, if it is supported by any sub-
stantial evidence and is not arbitrary or capri-
cious." 15 U2d 239, 240 
It is clear from the record that the proposed bank will 
be located on the Smith Plaza in Clearfield (Ex 1, p 13). Mr. 
Smith. one of the incorporators and president of the company 
which owns the plaza testified to the fact that he had been 
approached to construct the bank there and that they were pre-
pared to enter into a lease agreement upon the granting of the 
charter. (Tr 147) 
That the plaintiff had no question as to where the new 
bank would be located is evidenced by the fact that after appli-
cation was filed by the defendant, Bank of Northern Utah for 
,1pproval. plaintiff purchased land just down the street from 
,aid proposed construction site, (Tr 34 5) and then introduced 
testimony that they intended to build a new banking house 
rhcrc at some future date (Tr 29 5-296) 
The facts before the CiJmmissioner were clear as to the 
loL.ition of the new bank. This location being approximately 
011c-half mile fran the offices of the plaintiff, Clearfield State 
Bank. ITr 145) 
The record indicates that plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank 
1s the only bank located within Clearfield City, having been es-
tablished in 1917 (Tr 277) and that between 19 58 and 1968 its 
total assets increased from $4,878,489.00 to $9,210,266.00 
i Ex 1, p 50); that First Security Bank of Utah has assets of over 
one-half of one billion dollars and has a branch office serving the 
Hill Field area; that State Savings and Loan Association, which 
does not conduct a full banking business has assets of over 
93.000,000.00; that other protestant banks with locations more 
than 3 miles from the proposed site have likewise almost doubled 
their assets over a ten year period (Ex 1, p50); and that Clear-
fiel<l City with a population of over 10,000 (Tr 129), excluding 
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military personnel on Hill Air Force Base (Tr 327,355) has one 
bank, while Layton with a population of 14,289 has three banb 
(Ex 1, p 13) . 
Substantial evidence, some of which is set out above 
supports the conclusion of the Banking thr Ji, 
establishment of the defendant,Bank of Northern Utah, in Clear. 
field would not unreasonably interfere with the business of 
plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank, and that support for the new 
bank was not so lacking as to make improbable its success. 
At this point it should be noted that because of the 
different nature of branch banking the law specifically requires 
that in order to establish a branch bank one must show that 
"public convenience" and "advantage" will be promoted by the 
establishment of the branch. (7-3-6 UCA 1953 as amended). 
However, the law requires no such showing when the question is 
one of establishing a unit bank. (7-1-26 UCA 1953 as amended). 
Even assuming that such a showing must be made in the 
case of unit banks, the record is adequate to support such a find· 
ing. Mr. Steed, an officer of the plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank 
testified as to the poor and inconvenient location of their bank-
ing office (Tr 297) while at the same time the record shows that 
the office of defendant, Bank of Northern Utah will be construct-
ed in a shopping center convenient to all those who wish to avall 
themselves of its services. (Ex 1, p 13, Tr. 14 7) 
CONCLUSION 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions, as in the 
case of other administrative agencies, is given wide discretion in 
carrying out his administrative duties. His exercise of this dis· 
cretion may not be disturbed by this court unless found to be 
arbitrary, capricious or not supported by any substantial evid 
ence in the record. Nor, may this court substitute its judgment 
for that of the Commissioner in discretionary matters. 
At the hearing, consi<lerable evidence was introduced by 
both parties. The Commissioner allowing in and making available 
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ro th-c parties all evidence which was material and relevant to the 
qt1c,t1on there under consideration. 
Under the law as cited in Point I above, and the evidence 
,,;1tJincd in the record, it is clear that the proposed Bank of 
"Jorthern Utah constitutes a unit bank. It is a separate legal 
entity with a separate capital structure and with its own separate 
3nd distinct board of directors, loan base and deposit liability. 
Substantial evidence in the record pointed up the need 
and feasibility of the establishment of another unit bank in Clear-
field City. Relying on that evidence, the Commissioner approved 
the application of the defendant, Bank of Northern Utah to es-
tablish its offices within that City. 
From the record it cannot be said that the decision of the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, in granting the appli-
cation, was unsupported by any substantial evidence in the re-
cord or that his action was arbitrary or capricious. For this 
rea;on, this Court should affirm the decision of the district court 
upholding the Commissioner's action in granting the application 
of defendant, Bank of Northern Utah to establish a unit bank in 
Clearfield City. 
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